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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff7Appellee, : 
v. : 
DAVID SCOTT ANDERSON, : Case No. 20041095-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Appellant/Defendant David Scott Anderson ("Mr. Anderson" or "Appellant") 
appeals from a sentence on a final judgment of conviction for Theft, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (2003), entered by the Honorable 
Robin W. Reese, Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Utah. This Court has 
jurisdiction over criminal convictions other than first degree felonies. Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2a-3(e) (2002). A copy of the judgment is in Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE. STANDARD OF REVIEW. PRESERVATION 
Issue: Where a trial judge sentences a defendant for a single criminal offense, does 
another trial judge have jurisdiction and/or authority to amend to a harsher sentence at 
the Order to Show Cause hearing? 
Standard of Review: Although sentencing decisions are generally reviewed for an 
abuse of discretion (State v. Perez, 2002 UT App 211, f25, 52 P.3d 451), this issue 
involves an issue of statutory construction and jurisdiction which are questions of law . 
See State v. Schofield. 2002 UT 132, |6, 63 P.3d 667. 
Preservation. This issue was preserved below. R. 55:18-19. 
TEXT OF RELEVANT STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The text of the following statutes and constitutional provisions are in 
Addendum B: 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6 (2003); 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (2003); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (2003); 
U.S. Const, amend. V; 
Utah Const, art. I, §12. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On January 15,2003, the state charged Mr. Anderson by Information with Theft, a 
first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (2003) and Burglary, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (2003). R. 2-3. On 
December 4, 2003, Mr. Anderson entered a guilty plea to the state's amended charges of 
Theft a third degree felony and dismissal of the Burglary charge. R. 66; 55:1,6,9. 
Judge Noel sentenced Mr. Anderson to an indeterminate term not to exceed five years in 
the Utah State Prison. R. 66; 55:14-15. The prison term was suspended and Mr. 
Anderson was placed on probation for 18 months to be supervised by Adult Probation 
and Parole ("AP&P"). R. 67; 55:14-15. Mr. Anderson was not required to pay a fine. 
R. 67. 
2 
On August 16,2004, Mr. Anderson pled guilty in another case to two counts of 
Aggravated Robbery, first degree felonies in front of Judge Atherton. See Addendum C: 
District Court Docket in Case No. 041901010. On October 4, 2004, Judge Atherton 
sentenced Mr. Anderson to two indeterminate terms of not less than six years and which 
may be for life in the Utah State Prison. See Addendum D: Judgment in Case No. 
041901010.1 Judge Atherton ordered that the commitments run concurrently to each 
other. See id. 
On December 6, 2004, an order to show cause hearing was held before Judge 
Robin Reese who had been assigned this case from Judge Noel. R. 42; 55:17. Judge 
Reese ordered Mr. Anderson's probation revoked and imposed his suspended prison 
sentence but added that the term was to run consecutively with the aggravated robbery 
charges for which Mr. Anderson was also serving time. R. 42-43; 55:19. Mr. Anderson 
timely appealed. R. 45-46. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Mr. Anderson pled guilty in this case in front of Judge Frank G. Noel to an 
amended charge of Theft, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
404. R. 66; 55:1, 6, 9. Judge Noel sentence Mr. Anderson to an indeterminate term not 
JBecause Judge Atherton's sentencing determination in the intervening 
conviction, case no. 041901010, significantly impacts the decision in this case as to who 
had jurisdiction and authority to sentence Mr. Anderson to consecutive terms, Mr. 
Anderson asks this Court to take judicial notice under Utah Rules of Evidence 201 of the 
trial court docket in Addendum C and judgment in Addendum D. 
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to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. R. 66; 55:14-15. The prison term was 
suspended and Mr. Anderson was placed on probation for 18 months to be supervised by 
Adult Probation and Parole. R. 67; 55:14-15. Judge Noel never signed the order of 
sentence, judgment and conviction entered into the record until appellate counsel 
requested a copy on May 31, 2005. See Supplemental Record. 
On August 16, 2004, Mr. Anderson subsequently pled guilty to two counts of 
Aggravated Robbery, first degree felonies in front of Judge Atherton. See Addendum C. 
Judge Atherton ordered AP&P to prepare a presentence report. See id. Judge Atherton 
sentenced Mr. Anderson to two indeterminate terms of not less than six years and which 
may be for life in the Utah State Prison. See Addendum D. The trial court ordered that 
the commitments run concurrently to each other, that Mr. Anderson be given credit for 
239 days served and recommended a mental health evaluation. See id. 
On December 6, 2004, an order to show cause hearing was held in this case. The 
case was reassigned to Judge Reese to determine at the order to show cause hearing 
whether Mr. Anderson had violated his probation. R. 42; 55:17. Mr. Anderson admitted 
that he had violated his probation by being charged with aggravated robbery and having 
possessed a firearm without written authorization. R. 31; 55:17, 18. Judge Reese 
revoked Mr. Anderson's probation and then in regard to imposition of the original 
sentence stated "I guess the question is concurrent or consecutive." R. 55:18. Defense 
counsel pointed out that Judge Atherton had already sentenced Mr. Anderson to 
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concurrent terms on the aggravated robbery charges after the original sentence was 
imposed in the current case and that the trial court could now only impose the original 
prison term ordered. R. 55:19. Judge Reese instead ordered Mr. Anderson's suspended 
prison sentence of zero to five to run consecutively to the aggravated robbery charges 
Judge Atherton had previously sentenced Mr. Anderson. R. 42-43; 55:19. Mr. 
Anderson objected. R. 55:19. This appeal follows. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Once a trial court enters an order of judgment into the record and acts upon it, the 
sentence becomes final. After the order in this case became final, the trial court's 
authority and jurisdiction continued only over the defendant's probation terms. The trial 
court did not retain jurisdiction or authority over the case to increase the sentence 
originally imposed. The only jurisdiction and authority a trial court has at an order to 
show cause hearing is to revoke, modify, continue, or order the entire probation term to 
start over. In this case, the trial court erred in amending Mr. Anderson's sentence and 
ordering it to be served consecutively to a sentence imposed by a different judge in an 
intervening case. The trial court's error violated Mr. Anderson's constitutional and 
statutory rights against double jeopardy. Even if the trial court did have the authority to 
amend Mr. Anderson's sentence to be served consecutively to the other sentences 
imposed, it abused its discretion when it failed to consider the statutory factors necessary 
for ordering a consecutive sentence. 
5 
ARGUMENT 
POINT. WHERE A TRIAL COURT HAS ACTED ON ITS ORDER OF 
JUDGMENT AND ENTERED IT INTO THE RECORD, THE COURT UPON 
REVOKING PROBATION CANNOT INCREASE THE SENTENCE 
ORIGINALLY IMPOSED. 
While a trial court has "continuing jurisdiction over all probationers," until the 
probation term is completed, it is without jurisdiction or authority once it acts on an order 
of judgment and sentence from amending the original sentence imposed upon revocation 
of probation. See Utah Code Ann. 77-18-1 (2) (b) (iii) (2003). In this case, the trial 
court erred after it revoked Mr. Anderson's probation and ordered the original sentence 
imposed to be served consecutively to a sentence imposed by a different judge in an 
intervening case. The trial court's error violated Mr. Anderson's constitutional and 
statutory rights against double jeopardy. 
"In a Utah criminal case, a final judgment occurs when the trial court enters the 
written judgment of conviction, including the sentence, into the record." State v. Todd , 
2004 UT App 266,1fl0 n.l, 98 P.3d 46, cert, granted. 109 P.3d 804. After entering a 
valid final judgment of conviction, the trial court loses jurisdiction to amend the 
sentence. See State v. Montova. 825 P.2d 676, 679 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) ("Once a court 
imposes a valid sentence, it loses subject matter jurisdiction over the case.")., In this case, 
on December 5, 2003, Judge Noel announced a suspended sentence on Mr. Anderson 
and placed him on probation for 18 months. R. 66. The trial court reduced the sentence 
to writing and entered it into the record, on December 5, 2003, implementing the 
6 
sentence announced, and Mr. Anderson's probation commenced. R. 66. 
Although the court reduced the sentence to a written judgment and implemented 
that judgment, a signed judgment was inadvertently not entered until May 31,2005 after 
appellate counsel requested a copy of the signed judgment. See Supplemental Record. 
Such a scenario is fundamentally different than State v. Currv. 814 P.2d 1150 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991) and State v. Wright, 904 P.2d 1101 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) where the trial 
court only orally announced sentence and that it would not be making the judgment final 
by signing it until it had considered further evidence. Moreover, since the sentence had 
been implemented and an order to show cause based on the orders in the judgment was 
ultimately held, the judgment was entered. The circumstances in this case are 
distinguishable from Curry and Wright where the record established that the trial court 
had not imposed a final sentence. 
In Curry, the defendant pled guilty to a second degree felony and a third degree 
felony with the State recommendation that the sentences be served concurrently. 814 
P.2d at 1150. On May 18, 1990, the trial court ordered sentences of one to fifteen years 
for the second degree felony and zero to five on the third degree felony to be served 
concurrently with one another. 1(1 The defendant then sought to include additional 
information for the court's consideration in sentencing and "moved the court to set-aside 
the sentence and order a ninety-day evaluation." Id. The court held a hearing on May 
23, 1990, on the defendant's motion and filed a minute entry which stated "' 1. THE 
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COURT WILL NOT SIGN THE JUDGMENT, SENTENCE (COMMITMENT) THAT 
WAS ORDERED ON MAY 18,1990. 2. THE DEFENDANT IS ORDERED TO 
COMPLETE A 90 DAY EVALUATION AT THE UTAH STATE PRISON. THE 
SENTENCE IS CONTINUED TO AUGUST 31,1990 at 10:30 AM."' Id_ (emphasis in 
original). On September 7, 1990, after the court had received the evaluation ordered, it 
"sentenced defendant to the same prison terms but ordered that they be served 
consecutively." Id This Court held that the trial court's subsequent imposition of a 
consecutive sentence did not violate Utah Code Ann. §76-3-405 (1990) because the trial 
court's "oral statement... regarding defendant's sentence was not reduced to writing" 
until September 7th, therefore, the sentence was not "'set aside'" within the meaning of 
that statute. Id at 1151. 
Similarly, in Wright, the defendant pled guilty to attempted possession of an 
incendiary device and the trial court ordered a presentence report, setting sentencing for 
June 20. 904 P.2d at 1102. Sentencing was continued until July 11,1994, when AP&P 
failed to prepare the presentence report. Id. At the July 11th sentencing, the presentence 
report was still not complete but "defense counsel urged the court to proceed with 
sentencing." Id 
The trial court announced from the bench that is would sentence Wright to 
zero to five years in state prison, but that it would suspend the prison term 
pending Wright's successful completion of a thirty-six month probationary 
period. [However, a]t a hearing held one week later, July 18, 1994, the trial 
court announced that it would not sign the proposed commitment order 
until it had a chance to review the presentence report from AP&P. The trial 
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court stated, "There is no judgment, there is no sentence until I sign those 
papers." 
Id. (emphasis added). 
At the August 1 hearing defense counsel "proffered mental health information for 
the trial court to consider in sentencing Wright." Id. At the August 29 hearing, after 
reviewing the presentence report, the trial court sentenced defendant to zero to five years 
in state prison, with credit for time served. Id. This time, however, the trial court did not 
grant the defendant probation. Id. This Court determined that this defendant like the one 
in Curry "sought to include in the presentence report additional information for the trial 
court's consideration after the oral pronouncement of sentence, but also after the trial 
court had indicated its intent to modify the originally announced sentence." IcL. In 
affirming the trial court, this Court held that since the trial court's oral statement of 
sentencing had not been reduced to writing, the sentence was not entered until the time it 
was "reduced to writing and signed." Id. 
Unlike the trial court in Currv and Wright, the trial court in this case did reduce 
Mr. Anderson's sentence to writing and entered it into the record. R. 66. In addition, 
unlike the trial courts in those cases, the trial court in this case did not state on the record 
that it was refusing to sign the order pending receiving further evidence. Nor did it 
indicate any intention of modifying the sentence in the future. Finally, unlike Currv and 
Wright, Mr. Anderson's sentence commenced on the date it was announced and Mr. 
Anderson began serving the sentence on that date. Once a trial court enters an order of 
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judgment into the record and a defendant begins serving a sentence, that sentence 
becomes final. This insures that such clerical omissions do not affect the substantial 
rights of a defendant or undermine the justice system. See. Utah R. Crim. P. 30. 
Therefore, once the trial court entered a written order of judgment into the record, and 
acted on it, the order was final and the trial court lost the authority to do anything other 
than to impose the original sentence entered upon revocation of Mr. Anderson's 
probation. See Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873); Utah Code Aim. §77-18-
l(12)(e)(iii). 
"When interpreting a statute, this [C]ourt looks first to the statute's plain language 
to determine the Legislature's intent and purpose"... reading "'the plain language of the 
statute as a whole . . . . ' " State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Sundance Dev. Corp., 2003 
UT App 367, TJ4, 78 P.3d 995 (citations omitted). The court's purpose when interpreting 
statutory language is "Ho render all parts [of the statute] relevant and meaningful,' and . . 
. presume the legislature use[d] each term advisedly and . . . according to its ordinary 
meaning." State v. Maestas. 2002 UT 123, Tf52, 63 P.3d 621 (alterations in original) 
(citations omitted). In doing so, the court seeks to "'avoid interpretations that will render 
portions of a statute superfluous or inoperative.'" Id., (citations omitted). 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 grants trial courts the authority after an order to show 
cause hearing to order "probation revoked, modified, continued, or that the entire 
probation term commence anew." Id. at § 77-18-1 (12) (e) (ii). If the trial court 
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determines that probation should be revoked then the statute only allows the trial court 
the authority to either sentence the defendant if he has not previously been sentenced or 
execute the sentence previously imposed. Id. at (12) (e) (iii) ("If probation is revoked, 
the defendant shall be sentenced or the sentence previously imposed shall be executed.11). 
In this case, Judge Noel had already entered a sentence against Mr. Anderson; therefore, 
the trial court was only left with the authority to execute the sentence previously 
imposed. Instead, the trial court at the order to show cause hearing amended the original 
sentence and ordered it to run consecutively with the other sentences Mr. Anderson was 
ordered to serve in another case by Judge Atherton. Only Judge Atherton, who 
sentenced Mr. Anderson after Judge Noel sentenced him in this case, had jurisdiction and 
authority to order consecutive sentencing in the aggravated robbery case based on Mr. 
Anderson's past and present criminal conduct. The trial court's subsequent consecutive 
sentence at the order to show cause hearing in this case constitutes a more severe 
punishment than originally ordered by Judge Noel and violates Mr. Anderson 
constitutional and statutory protections against double jeopardy. See U.S. Const, amend. 
V; Utah Const, art. I, § 12; Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6 (2) (a) (2003). 
The Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy, applicable to the States 
through the Fourteenth Amendment, protects individuals from multiple punishments for 
the same offense. U.S. Const, amend. V ("nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."); Utah Const, art. I, § 12 ("nor shall 
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any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense."); Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6 (2) 
(a) ("No person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense."). "If there is 
anything settled in the jurisprudence of England and America, it is that no man can be 
twice lawfully punished for the same offence. And . . . there has never been any doubt of 
[this rule's] entire and complete protection of the party when a second punishment is 
proposed in the same court, on the same facts, for the same statutory offense." North 
Carolina v.Pearce. 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969) (quoting Ex parte Lange . 85 U.S. (18 
Wall.) 163 (1873)). The United States Supreme Court determined long ago that double 
jeopardy is violated when a trial court increases a sentence after a defendant has 
commenced to serve it. Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. at 176. "The Constitution was designed 
as much to prevent the criminal from being twice punished for the same offence as from 
being twice tried for it." Id. at 173. Therefore, the trial court violated double jeopardy in 
this case where it entered a judgment and it increased Mr. Anderson's sentence after he 
had already commenced serving it. The trial court was without jurisdiction or authority 
under either the constitution or statute to run Mr. Anderson's original sentence 
consecutively to the intervening convictions. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (2) (2003) states that "[i]n determining whether state 
offenses are to run concurrently or consecutively, the court shall consider the gravity and 
circumstances of the offenses, the number of victims, and the history, character, and 
rehabilitative needs of the defendant." Id. In determining whether to sentence 
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Mr. Anderson to consecutive terms for his aggravated robbery convictions, Judge 
Atherton followed section 76-3-401(2) and considered all of the required factors.2 After 
doing so, Judge Atherton ordered Mr. Anderson's sentences to be served concurrently, 
recommended credit for 239 days served, and recommended he receive a mental health 
evaluation and treatment. See Addendum D. In contrast, the only jurisdiction the trial 
court had at the order to show cause hearing was to "revoke[], modif[y], continue[], or 
[order] the entire probation term commence anew," and if probation was revoked to 
execute the previous sentence imposed. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (e) (ii), (iii). Even if 
the trial judge had the ability to order the previous sentence imposed to be served 
consecutively, the trial court abused its discretion in this case by not considering the 
necessary statutory factors. See State v. McCovev. 803 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Utah 1990) 
("An abuse of discretion results when the judge 'fails to consider all legally relevant 
[sentencing] factors.") (quoting State v. Gibbons. 779 P.2d 1133,1135 (Utah 1989) 
(footnote omitted)); R. 55:19. Instead the trial court stated: 
I'll impose the indeterminate term of zero to five years, Mr. Anderson, and 
just looking at the kinds of charges that you've admitted committing] 
while on probation it seems that it would be just in my judgment to run 
them consecutively, run this charge consecutively with the others. The 
2Because Judge Atherton was the only judge who had jurisdiction and authority to 
sentence Mr. Anderson to consecutive terms and considered all of the statutory elements, 
Mr. Anderson asks this Court to take judicial notice under Utah Rules of Evidence 201 
of the video tape sentencing hearing in case number 041901010 FS held on October 4, 
2004. 
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others are serious violent charges apparently involving firearms, so I'll 
impose this to run consecutively. 
R. 55:19. 
While the trial court noted the gravity and circumstances of the offense, it failed to 
consider Anderson's history, character or rehabilitative needs when it imposed the 
consecutive sentence. See State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12, |15,40 P.3d 626 (Trial court 
abuses its discretion when it fails to give "' adequate weight to certain mitigating 
circumstances.'" (quoting State v. GallL 967 P.2d 930, 938 (Utah 1998)). Therefore, 
even if the trial court had the ability to impose Mr. Anderson's prison term to be served 
consecutively, it abused its discretion in failing to consider all relevant factors as required 
by Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (2). 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellant, Mr. Anderson, respectfully requests this Court to reverse the trial 
court's imposition of his original sentence as consecutive to the aggravated robbery 
convictions he is serving in another case. 
SUBMITTED this 15** day of July, 2005. 
^t2/^ A? J, 
DEBRA M.NELSON 
C.BEVANCORRY 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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Disposition: 12/04/2003 Guilty 
3rd Degree 
DEFT ADMITTS ALLEGATIONS 2 - 3 
DENIES ALLEGATION 1 - C/O STRICKEN ON STATE MOTION 
COURT ORDERED PROBATION REVOKED, DEFT TO SERVE PRISON TERM 
Page 1 
Case No: 031900326 
Date: Dec 06, 2004 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT a 3rd Degree Felony, 
the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to 
exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
COURT ORDERED TO RUN CONSECUTIVE 
Page 2 (last) 
ADDENDUM B 
77-1-6. Rights of defendant. 
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled: 
(a) lb appear in person and defend in person or by counsel; 
(b) To receive a copy of the accusation filed against him; 
(c) To testify in his own behalf; 
(d) lb be confronted by the witnesses against him; 
(e) To have compulsory process to insure the attendance of witnesses in 
his behalf; 
(f) To a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district 
where the offense is alleged to have been committed; 
(g) To the right of appeal in all cases; and 
(h) To be admitted to bail in accordance with provisions of law, or be 
entitled to a trial within 30 days after arraignment if unable to post bail 
and if the business of the court permits. 
(2) In addition: 
(a) No person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense; 
(b) No accused person shall, before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure rights guaranteed by the Constitution or 
the laws of Utah, or to pay the costs of those rights when received; 
(c) No person shall be compelled to give evidence against himself; 
(d) A wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband nor a 
husband against his wife; and 
(e) No person shall be convicted unless by verdict of a jury, or upon a 
plea of guilty or no contest, or upon a judgment of a court when trial by 
jury has been waived or, in case of an infraction, upon a judgment by a 
magistrate. 
77-18-1 • Suspension of sentence — Pleas held in abeyance 
— Probation — Supervision — Presentence in-
vestigation — Standards — Confidentiality — 
Terms and conditions — Termination, revoca-
tion, modification, or extension — Hearings — 
Electronic monitoring. 
(1) On a plea of guilty or no contest entered by a defendant in conjunction 
with a plea in abeyance agreement, the court may hold the plea in abeyance as 
provided in Title 77, Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, and under the terms of the 
plea in abeyance agreement 
(2) (a) On a plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, no contest, or conviction 
of any crime or offense, the court may, after imposing sentence, suspend 
the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation. The 
court may place the defendant: 
ii> on probation under the supervision of the Department of Cor-
rections except in cases of class C misdemeanors or infractions; 
(ii) on probation with an agency of local government or with a 
private organization; or 
(iii) on bench probation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing 
court. 
lb; U> The legal ru.4o.ly of all probationers under the supervision of the 
department is with the department.
 # 
(ii) The legal custody of all probationers under the jurisdiction of 
the sentencing court is vested as ordered by the court, 
(iii) The court has continuing jurisdiction over all probationers. 
Hi) l:i> The department shall establish supervision and presentence inves-
tigation standards for all individuals referred to the department. These 
standards shall be based on: 
(i) the type of offense; 
(iii the demand for servicer; 
(iii) the availability of agency resources 
(iv) the public safety; and 
(v) other criteria established by the department to determine what 
level of services shall be provided. 
(hi Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submit-
ted to the Judicial Council and the Board of Pardons and Parole on an 
annual basis for review and comment prior to adoption by the department. 
(c) The Judicial Council and the department shall establish procedures 
to implement the supervision and investigation standards. 
(d) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually consider 
modifications to the standards based upon criteria in Subsection (3)(a) and 
other criteria as thty consider appropriate. 
le) The Judicial Council and tho department shall annually prepare an 
impact report and submit it to the appropriate legislative appropriations 
subcommittee. 
(4) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the department 13 not required 
to supervise the probation of persons convicted of class B or C misdemeanors 
or infractions or to conduct presentence investigation reports on class C 
misdemeanors or infractions. However, the department may supervise the 
probation of class B misdemeanants in accordance with department standards. 
15) (a) Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the 
concurrence of the defendant, continue the date for the imposition of 
sentence for a reasonable period of time for the purpose of obtaining a 
presentence investigation report from the department or information from 
other sources about the defendant. 
(b) The presentence investigation report shall include a victim impact 
statement according to guidelines set in Section 77-38a-203 describing the 
effect of the crime on the victim and the victim's family. 
(c) The presentence investigation report shall include a specific state-
ment of pecuniary damages, accompanied by a recommendation from the 
department regarding the payment of restitution with interest by the 
defendant in accordance with Titlo 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims 
Restitution Act. . 
(d) The contents of the presentence investigation report, including any 
diagnostic evaluation report ordered by the court under Section 76-3-404, 
are protected and are not available except by court order for purposes of 
sentencing as provided by rule of the Judicial Council or for use by the 
department. 
(8) (ai The department shall provide the presentence investigation report 
to the defendants attorney, or the defendant if not represented by counsel, 
the prosecutor, and the court for review, three working days prior to 
sentencing. Any alleged inaccuracies in the presentence investigation 
report, which have not been resolved by the parties and the department 
prior to sentencing, shall be brought to the attention of the sentencing 
judge, and the judge may grant an additional ten working days to resolve 
the alleged inaccuracies of the report with the department. If after ten 
working days the inaccuracies cannot be resolved, the court shall make a 
determination of relevance and accuracy on the record. 
(b) If a party fails to challenge the accuracy of the presentence inves-
tigation report at the time of sentencing, that matter shall be considered 
to be waived. 
(7) At the time of sentence, the court shall receive any testimony, evidence, 
or information the defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present 
concerning the appropriate sentence. This testimony, evidence, or information 
shall be presented in open court on record and in the presence of the defendant. 
(8) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the court may 
require that the defendant: 
{a) perform any or all of the following: 
W pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time of being 
placed on probation; 
(ii) pay amounts required under Title 77, Chapter 32a, Defense 
Costs; 
(iii) provide for the support of others for whose support he is legally 
liable; 
liv^ participate in available treatment programs; 
(vi serve a period of time, not to exceed one year, in a county jail 
designated by the department, after considering any recommendation 
by the court as to which jail the court finds most appropriate; 
(vi) serve a term of home confinement, which may include the use 
of electronic monitoring; 
ivii) participate in compensator}' service restitution programs, in-
cluding the compensatory sendee program provided in Section 78-11-
20.7; 
(viii) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, and treatment 
services; 
(ix) make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims with 
interest in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims 
Restitution Act; and 
(x> comply with other terms and conditions the court considers 
appropriate; and 
<b> if convicted on or after May 5, 1997: 
(i) complete high school classwork and obtain a high school gradu-
ation diploma, a GED certificate, or a vocational certificate at the 
defendant's own expense if the defendant has not received the 
diploma, GED certificate, or vocational certificate prior to being 
placed on probation; or 
Hi) provide documentation of the inability to obtain one of the items 
listed in Subsection (8Mb)(i*> because of: 
(A) a diagnosed learning disability; or 
(B) other justified cause. 
(9) The department shall collect and disburse the account receivable as 
defined by Section 76-3-201.1, with interest and any other costs assessed under 
Section 64-13-21 during: 
(aJ the parole poriod and any extension of that period in accordance 
with Subsection 77-27-6(4); and 
(b) the probation period in cases for which the court orders supervised 
probation and any extension of that period by the department in accor-
dance with Subsection (10). 
(10) (a) (i) Probation may be terminated at any time at the discretion of the 
court or upon completion without violation of 36 months probation in 
felony or class A misdemeanor cases, or 12 months in cases of class B 
or C misdemeanors or infractions, 
(ii) (A) If, upon expiration or termination of the probation period 
under Subsection (10)(a)(i), there remains an unpaid balance 
upon the account receivable as defined in Section 76-3-201.1, the 
court may retain jurisdiction of the case and continue the defen-
dant on bench probation for the limited purpose of enforcing the 
payment of the account receivable. 
(B) In accordance with Section 77-18-6, the court shall record 
in the registry of civil judgments any unpaid balance not already 
recorded and immediately transfer responsibility to collect the 
account to the Office of State Debt Collection, 
(iii) Upon motion of the Office of State Debt Collection, prosecutor, 
victim, or upon its own motion, the court may require the defendant to 
show cause why his failure to pay should not be treated as contempt 
of court, 
(b) (i) The department shall notify the sentencing court, the Office of 
State Debt Collection, and the prosecuting attorney in writing in 
advance in all cases when termination of supervised probation will 
occur by law. 
(ii) The notification shall include a probation progress report and 
complete report of details on outstanding accounts receivable. 
(11) (a) ii) Any time served by a probationer outside of confinement after 
having been charged with a probation violation and prior to a hearing 
to revoke probation does not constitute service of time toward the total 
probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at a hearing to 
revoke the probation. 
(ii) Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or decision 
concerning revocation of probation does not constitute service of time 
toward the total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated 
at the hearing. 
(b) The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a 
violation report with the court alleging a violation of the terms and 
conditions of probation or upon the issuance of an order to show cause or 
warrant by the court. 
(12) (a) (i) Probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver 
of a hearing by the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in 
court that the probationer has violated the conditions of probation. 
(iij Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court 
and a finding that the conditions of probation have been violated, 
(b) (i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts 
asserted to constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the 
court that authorized probation shall determine if the affidavit 
establishes probable cause to believe that revocation, modification, or 
extension of probation is justified. 
iii.' M'ihi court drtcnii.ii^o difie iy pu'bahte must*, it shall cause tu 
be served on the defendant u warrant for his arrest or a copy of the 
affidavit and an order tn shuvv t.tii^* why his probation should not bo 
revoked, n'odified. or extended. 
ic> (i) The order to ylmw can^o shd! soecifv a time and place for thp 
hraring and sha!J bo served upo'j :hc del* laLmi at l«*asi five dajs prinr 
to the hearing, 
(ii) The defendant shall show pood rauso for a continuance, 
liii) The order tn show cause .shall inform tlu» defendant of a right 
to be represented by counsel at the hearing and to have counsel 
appointed for him if he is indigent. 
(iv) The oider shall also inform the defendant of a right to present 
evidence, 
(d) fi) At the hearing, thedefendant shall admit or deny the allegations 
of the affidavit. 
lii) If the defendant denies tin* allegations of the affidavit, the 
prosecuting attorney shall pi cent evidence on the allegations. 
liii) The persons who have given adverse in formation, on which the 
allegations are based shall lie presented as witnesses subject to 
questioning by the defendant unless rhe court for good cause other-
wise orders. 
<'iv) The defendant may call witnesses, appear and speak in lib own 
behalf, and present evidence. 
fei (i) After the hearing the com I shall make findings of fact. 
(ii) Upon a finding that the defendant violated the conditions of 
probation, the court may order the probation revoked, modified, 
continued, or that the. entire probation term commence anew. 
(iii'i If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be sentenced or the 
sentence previously imposed shah Le executed. 
• 13* The court may order the defendant to commit himself to tbe custody of 
the Division of Suhfttanre Abuse and Mental Health for treatment at the Utah 
State Hospital as a condition of probation or stay of sentence, only after the 
superintendent of the IJlah Stat* liVpltnl or hi-< designee Inn certified to the 
court that: 
la) the defendant H appropriate fer and ran benefit from treatment at 
the state hospital; 
lb* treatment space at the hospital is available for the defendant; and 
<c) persons described in Subsection fi2A-15-6lQ(2)(g> are receiving pri-
ority for treatment over the defendants described in this Subsection (13). 
<14) Presentence investigation report?, including presentence diagnostic 
evaluations, are classified protected in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 2, 
Government Records Access and Management Act. Notwithstanding Sections 
63-2-403 and 63-2404, tbe State Records Committee may not order the 
disclosure of a presentence investigation report. Except for disclosure at the 
time of sentencing pursuant to this section, the department may disclose the 
presentence investigation only when: 
(a) ordered by the court puisuant to Subsection 63-2-202(7); 
(b) requested by a law enforcement agency or other agency approved by 
the department for put poses of supojvisiofi, confinement, and treatment of 
the offender; 
*c/ requested by the Hoard of Panloiis uud-Pcrole: 
(d) requested by the subject of the presentence investigation report or 
the subject's authorized representative; or 
ie) requested by the victim of the crime discussed in the presentence 
investigation report or the victim's authorized representative, provided 
that the disclosure to the victim shall include only information relating to 
statements or materials provided by the victim, to the circumstances of the 
crime including statements by the defendant, or to the impact of the crime 
on the victim or the victim's household. 
15) (a) The court shall consider home confinement as a condition of 
probation under the supervision of the department, except as provided in 
Sections 76-3-406 and 76-5-406.5. 
(b) The department shall establish procedures and standards for home 
confinement, including electronic monitoring, for all individuals referred 
to the department in accordance with Subsection (16). 
16) (a) If the court places the defendant on probation under this section, it 
may order the defendant to participate in home confinement through the 
use of electronic monitoring as described in this section until further order 
of the court. 
(b) The electronic monitoring shall alert the department and the 
appropriate law enforcement unit of the defendant's whereabouts. 
(c) The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions 
which require: 
(i) the defendant to wear an electronic monitoring device at all 
times; and 
(ii) that a device be placed in the home of the defendant, so that the 
defendant's compliance with the court's order may be monitored. 
(d) If a court orders a defendant to participate in home confinement 
through electronic monitoring as a condition of probation under this 
section, it shall: 
(i) place the defendant on probation under the supervision of the 
Department of Corrections; 
(ii) order the department to place an electronic monitoring device 
on the defendant and install electronic monitoring equipment in the 
residence of the defendant; and 
(iii) order the defendant to pay the costs associated with home 
confinement to the department or the program provider. 
(e) The department shall pay the costs of home confinement through 
electronic monitoring only for those persons who have been determined to 
be indigent by the court. 
(f) The department may provide the electronic monitoring described in 
this section either directly or by contract with a private provider. 
76-3-401. Concurrent or consecutive sentences — Limita-
tions — Definition. 
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more 
than one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences 
for the offenses. The court shall state on the record and shall indicate in the 
order of judgment and commitment: 
i a) if the sentences imposed an; to run concurrently or consecutively to 
each other; and 
(b) if the sentences before the court are to run concurrently or consec-
utively with any other sentences the defendant is already serving. 
(2) In determining whether state offenses are to run concurrently or 
consecutively, the court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the 
offenses, the number of victims, and the history, character, and rehabilitative 
needs of the defendant. 
(3) The court shall order that sentences for state offenses run consecutively 
if the later offense is committed while the defendant is imprisoned or on parole, 
unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentencing 
would be inappropriate. 
(4) If a written order of commitment does not clearly state whether the 
sentences are to run consecutively or concurrently, the Board of Pardons and 
Parole shall request clarification from the court. Upon receipt of the request, 
the court shall enter a clarified order of commitment stating whether the 
sentences are to run consecutively or concurrently. 
(5) A court may impose consecutive sentences for pffenses arising out of a 
single criminal episode as defined in Section 76-1-401. 
(6) (a) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of 
all sentences imposed may not exceed 30 years imprisonment, except as 
provided under Subsection (6)(b). 
lb) The limitation under Subsection 16Ma) does not apply if: 
(i) an offense for which the defendant is sentenced authorizes the 
death penalty or a maximum sentence of life imprisonment; or 
(ii.) the defendant is convicted of an additional offense based on 
conduct which occurs after his initial sentence or sentences are 
imposed. 
(7) The limitation in Subsection (6Xa) applies if a defendant: 
(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense; 
(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more offenses, all of which 
were committed prior to imposition of the defendant's initial sentence; or 
(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the 
present sentencing court or by a court of another state or federal 
jurisdiction, and the conduct giving rise to the present offense did not 
occur after his initial sentencing by any other court. 
(8) When the limitation of Subsection (6)(a) applies, determining the effect 
of consecutive sentences and the manner in which they shall be served, the 
Board of Pardons and Parole shall treat the defendant as though he has been 
committed for a single term that consists nf the aggregate of the validly 
imposed prison terms as follows: 
(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation, the 
maximum sentence is considered to be 30 years; and 
(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum 
term, if any, constitutes the aggregate of the validly imposed minimum 
terms. 
(9) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concur-
rently with the other or with a sentence presently being served, the term that 
provides the longer remaining imprisonment constitutes the time to be served. 
(10) This section may not be construed to restrict the number or length of 
individual consecutive sentences that may be imposed or to affect the validity 
of any sentence so imposed, but only to limit the length of sentences actually 
served under the commitments. 
'11) This section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to 
impose consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases. 
112) As used in this section, "imprisoned" means sentenced and committed 
to a secure correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1, the sentence has 
not been terminated or voided, and the person is not on parole, regardless of 
where the person is located. 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT V 
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due process 
of law and just compensation clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases 
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in 
time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation. 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appa.ir and 
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and ca i-;e of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, ta testify in his own behalf, to 
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a dpaedj public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the c& LS*» is 
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases m no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment* be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The aroused 
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himueif; a wife shall not ba 
compelled to testily against her husband, nor a husband ag:iinst his wit,, ^or 
shall any person be twice~ptttin Jeopardy for the same itfTemj* 
ADDENDUM C 
3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH vs. DAVID SCOTT ANDERSON 
CASE NUMBER 041901010 State Felony 
Defendants TIMOTHY J AUKUSITINO, DAVID SCOTT ANDERSON, RYAN 
DANIEL BINKS, JOSHUA FUNGALEI LOLOHEA, are linked. 
CHARGES 
Charge 1 - 76-6 
1st Degree 
Disposition 
Charge 2 - 76-6 
1st Degree 
Disposition 
Charge 3 - 76-6 
1st Degree 
Disposition 
Charge 4 - 76-6 
1st Degree 
Disposition 
Charge 5 - 76-6 
1st Degree 
Disposition 
Charge 6 - 76-6 
1st Degree 
Disposition 
Charge 7 - 76-8 
1st Degree 
Disposition 
302 - AGGRAVATED ROBBERY 
Felony Plea: August 16, 2004 Guilty 
August 16, 2004 Guilty 
302 - AGGRAVATED ROBBERY 
Felony Plea: August 16, 2004 Guilty 
August 16, 2004 Guilty 
-302 - AGGRAVATED ROBBERY 
Felony Plea: May 10, 2004 Not Guilty 
August 16, 2004 Dismissed 
-302 - AGGRAVATED ROBBERY 
Felony Plea: May 10, 2004 Not Guilty 
August 16, 2004 Dismissed 
-302 - AGGRAVATED ROBBERY 
Felony Plea: May 10, 2004 Not Guilty 
August 16, 2004 Dismissed 
-302 - AGGRAVATED ROBBERY 
Felony Plea: May 10, 2004 Not Guilty 
August 16, 2004 Dismissed 
-306 - OBSTRUCT JUSTICE 
Felony Plea: May 10, 2004 Not Guilty 
August 16, 2004 Dismissed 
CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE 
JUDITH S ATHERTON 
PARTIES 
Defendant - DAVID SCOTT ANDERSON 
DRAPER, UT 
Represented by: L. BRUCE LARSEN 
Plaintiff - STATE OF UTAH 
Also Known As - " D-BOY " 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION Defendant Name: DAVID SCOTT ANDERSON 
Offense tracking number: 16109357 
Printed: 06/16/05 09:30:31 Page 1 
CASE NUMBER 041901010 State Felony 
Date of Birth: October 12, 1984 
Jail Booking Number: 
Law Enforcement Agency: MIDVALE CITY POLICE 
LEA Case Number: 04-003095 
Prosecuting Agency: SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Agency Case Number: 04002456 
Sheriff Office Number: 0269968 
Violation Date: February 08, 2004 6885 SOUTH STATE STREET 
ACCOUNT SUMMARY 
TOTAL REVENUE Amount Due: 325.50 
Amount Paid: 325.50 
Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
















02-12-04 Judge MAUGHAN assigned. 
02-12-04 Note: CASE FILED BY DET. ARGUETA OF MIDVALE POLICE DEFT IN JAIL 
WILL FAX WARRANT TO THE JAIL 
02-12-04 Case filed by laniv 
02-12-04 Filed: Information 
02-17-04 Note: Jim from Pre-Trial Services notified clerk defendant's 
Attorney Bruce Larsen request initial appearance of 2/19/04 
02-17-04 INITIAL APPEARANCE scheduled on February 19, 2004 at 09:00 AM 
in Arraignment Jail with Judge ARRAIGNMENT. 
02-17-04 Note: Judge reassigned from criminal filing screen due to new 
procedure for roll calls. 
02-17-04 Judge ATHERTON assigned. 
02-19-04 Minute Entry - Minutes for Initial Appearance 
Judge: ANN BOYDEN 
PRESENT 
Clerk: lynettm 
Prosecutor: CHRISTENSEN, VIRGINIA 0 
Defendant 
Video 
Tape Number: DISK 43 Tape Count: 93232 
Printed: 06/16/05 09:30:34 Page 2 
CASE NUMBER 041901010 State Felony 
INITIAL APPEARANCE 
The Information is read. 
Advised of charges and penalties. 
The defendant is advised of right to counsel. 
Defendant waives time for sentence. 
ROLL CALL is scheduled. 
Date: 02/26/2004 
Time: 02:00 p.m. 
Location: To Be Determined 
Third District Court 
450 South State 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Before Judge: PAUL G. MAUGHAN 
02-19-04 ROLL CALL scheduled on February 26, 2004 at 02:00 PM in To Be 
Determined with Judge MAUGHAN. 
02-19-04 Filed: Notice of Appearance of Counsel filed by L Bruce Larsen, 
Attorney for Defendant 
02-19-04 Filed: Request for Discovery filed by L Bruce Larsen, Attorney 
for Defendant 
02-23-04 Note: Bail remain $250,007 
02-26-04 Preliminary Hearing scheduled on March 11, 2004 at 09:00 AM in 
Third Floor - W37 with Judge MAUGHAN. 
02-26-04 Minute Entry - Minutes for Roll Call 
Judge: PAUL G. MAUGHAN 
PRESENT 
Clerk: terryb 
Prosecutor: JOHNSON, JOHN K 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): LARSEN, L. BRUCE 
Video 
Tape Count: off record 
HEARING 
COUNT: off record 
Court Orders Case set for Preliminary Hearing 
PRELIMINARY HEARING is scheduled. 
Date: 03/25/2004 
Time: 02:00 p.m. 
Location: Third Floor - W39 
Before Judge: BURTON, MICHAEL K. 
02-26-04 Preliminary Hearing Cancelled scheduled for: 3/11/04 
Reason: Counsel's request. 
02-26-04 Preliminary Hearing scheduled on March 25, 2004 at 02:00 PM in 
Third Floor - W39 with Judge BURTON. 
02-26-04 Note: ROLL CALL minutes modified. 
Printed: 06/16/05 09:30:36 Page 3 
CASE NUMBER 041901010 State Felony 
03-04-04 Filed: FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY 
03-25-04 Preliminary Hearing scheduled on April 01, 2004 at 02:00 PM in 
Fourth Floor - S41 with Judge MCCLEVE. 
03-25-04 Minute Entry - Minutes for Preliminary Hearing 
Judge: MICHAEL K. BURTON 
PRESENT 
Clerk: marcyt 
Reporter: SCHULTZ, KATHLEEN 
Prosecutor: MEISTER, VINCENT B 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): LARSEN, L. BRUCE 
Video 
HEARING 
The State's motion to continue is granted. 
PRELIMINARY HEARING is scheduled. 
Date: 04/01/2004 
Time: 02:00 p.m. 
Location: Fourth Floor - S41 
Before Judge: MCCLEVE, SHEILA K. 
04-01-04 Preliminary Hearing scheduled on April 22, 2004 at 02:00 PM in 
Fourth Floor - W4 6 with Judge LINDBERG. 
04-01-04 Minute Entry - Minutes for Preliminary Hearing 
Judge: SHEILA K. MCCLEVE 
PRESENT 
Clerk: lauraj 
Reporter: WARNICK, SUZANNE 
Prosecutor: MEISTER, VINCENT B 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): LARSEN, L. BRUCE 
Video 
Tape Number: 4/1/04 Tape Count: 2:26:28 
HEARING 
C/O SET FOR PRELIM 4/22/04 AT 2PM BEFORE JUDGE LINDBERG. COUNSELS 
ADVISED THE COURT THAT IS WILL BE A 3-HOUR SETTING WITH 8 WITNESSES 
AND 4 CO-DEFTS. 
04-07-04 Filed: letter from the defendant 
04-22-04 Note: Case Bound Over 
04-22-04 ARRAIGNMENT scheduled on May 10, 2004 at 08:30 AM in Fourth 
Floor - S4 4 with Judge ATHERTON. 
04-22-04 Note: INCOURT NOTE minutes modified. 
04-22-04 Minute Entry - Minutes for Preliminary Hearing 
Judge: DENISE P LINDBERG 
Clerk: valerieb 
Printed: 06/16/05 09:30:40 Page 4 
CASE NUMBER 041901010 State Felony 
Prosecutor: MEISTER, VINCENT B 
Defendant's Attorney(s): LARSEN, L. BRUCE 
HEARING 
TAPE: 4/22/04 COUNT: 2:55 
witness1 sworn 
COUNT: 2:56 
on the motion of the State, court ordered witnesses excluded 
COUNT: 2:56 
States witness Jose Argeta sworn and examined 
COUNT: 3:02 
States exhibit #9,10 & 11 MOA 
COUNT: 3:04 
State's exhibits 1 - 7 MOA 
COUNT: 3:14 
State's exhibit 8 <OA 
COUNT: 3:17 
Cross by Larsen 
COUNT: 3:20 




State's witness Ryan Binks previously sworn and examined 
COUNT: 4:13 






Cross by O'Connell 
COUNT: 4:33 




all defendant's advised of their rights and waive the right to 
testify 
COUNT: 4:41 
the court finds probable cause to bind this matter over 
the defendant was transported from the ADC 
CASE BOUNDOVER 
Defendant waived preliminary hearing, State consenting thereto. 
This case is bound over. An Arraignment hearing has been set on 
5/10/04 at 8:30 AM in courtroom S44 before Judge JUDITH S ATHERTON. 
05-06-04 Filed: LETTER TO COURT FROM DEFENDANT 
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CASE NUMBER 041901010 State Felony 
05-10-04 Minute Entry - Minutes for Arraignment 
Judge: JUDITH S ATHERTON 
PRESENT 
Clerk: lorip 
Prosecutor: KNELL, BRADLEY J 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): LARSEN, L. BRUCE 
Video 
Tape Number: video Tape Count: 9:08 
ARRAIGNMENT 
The Information is read. 
Advised of rights and penalties. 
Defendant is arraigned. 
FINAL PRETRIAL CONFERENCE is scheduled. 
Date: 08/16/2004 
Time: 08:30 a.m. 
Location: Fourth Floor - S44 
Third District Court 
450 South State 
SLC, UT 84114-1860 
Before Judge: JUDITH S ATHERTON 
JURY TRIAL. 
Date: 08/24/2004 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location: Fourth Floor - S44 
Third District Court 
450 South State 
SLC, UT 84114-1860 
Before Judge: JUDITH S ATHERTON 
JURY TRIAL. 
Date: 08/25/2004 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location: Fourth Floor - S44 
Third District Court 
450 South State 
SLC, UT 84114-1860 
Before Judge: JUDITH S ATHERTON 
JURY TRIAL. 
Date: 08/26/2004 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location: Fourth Floor - S44 
Third District Court 
450 South State 
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2004 at 09:00 AM in Fourth 
2004 at 09:00 AM in Fourth 
SLC, UT 84114-1860 
Before Judge: JUDITH S ATHERTON 
-10-04 FINAL PRETRIAL CONFERENCE scheduled on August 16, 2004 at 08:30 
AM in Fourth Floor - S4 4 with Judge ATHERTON. 
-10-04 JURY TRIAL scheduled on August 24, 2004 at 09:00 AM in Fourth 
Floor - S4 4 with Judge ATHERTON. 
-10-04 JURY TRIAL scheduled on August 25, 
Floor - S4 4 with Judge ATHERTON. 
-10-04 JURY TRIAL scheduled on August 26, 
Floor - S4 4 with Judge ATHERTON. 
-02-04 Filed: Transcript of preliminary hearing dated 4-22-04, Suzanne 
Warnick, Court Reporter 
-16-04 Filed: Third supplemental response to request for discovery 
-16-04 JURY TRIAL Cancelled. 
Reason: Case has been settled. 
•16-04 SENTENCING scheduled on October 04, 
Floor - S4 4 with Judge ATHERTON. 
1 Disposition is Guilty 
2 Disposition is Guilty 
3 Disposition is Dismissed 
4 Disposition is Dismissed 
5 Disposition is Dismissed 
6 Disposition is Dismissed 
7 Disposition is Dismissed 
-16-04 Minute Entry - Minutes for Change of Plea 
Judge: JUDITH S ATHERTON 










Prosecutor: KNELL, BRADLEY J 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): LARSEN, L. BRUCE 
Video 
Tape Number: VIDEO Tape Count: 11:23 
The Information is read. 
Court advises defendant of rights and penalties. 
A pre-sentence investigation was ordered. 
The Judge orders Adult Probation & Parole to prepare a Pre-sentence 
report. 
SENTENCING is scheduled. 
Date: 10/04/2004 
Time: 08:30 a.m. 
Location: Fourth Floor - S44 
Third District Court 
450 South State 
SLC, UT 84114-1860 
Before Judge: JUDITH S ATHERTON 
10-01-04 Filed: RECEIVED PSR FROM APAP 
Printed: 06/16/05 09:30:43 Page 7 
CASE NUMBER 041901010 State Felony 
10-04-04 Minute Entry - Minutes for SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITME 
Judge: JUDITH S ATHERTON 
PRESENT 
Clerk: lorip 
Prosecutor: KNELL, BRADLEY J 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): LARSEN, L. BRUCE 
Video 
Tape Number: VIDEO Tape Count: 10:27 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ROBBERY a 1st 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than six years and which may be life in the Utah State 
Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ROBBERY a 1st 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than six years and which may be life in the Utah State 
Prison. 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
COMMITMENTS TO RUN CONCURRENT. 
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE 
COURT RECOMMENDS DEFT RECEIVE CREDIT FOR 239 DAYS TIME SERVED. 
COURT ALSO RECOMMENDS DEFT RECEIVE MENTAL HEALTH EVALUATION AND 
TREATMENT. RESTITUTION TO BE DETERMINED BY BOARD OF PARDONS. 
10-13-04 Fee Account created Total Due: 325.50 
10-13-04 REPORTER FEES Payment Received: 325.50 
Note: REPORTER FEES 
05-04-05 Note: SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT minutes modified. 
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ADDENDUM D 
3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH 
STATE OP UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs, 
DAVID SCOTT ANDERSON, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 041901010 FS 
Judge; JUDITH S ATHERTON 
Date; October 4, 2004 
PRESENT 
Clerk: lorip 
Prosecutor: KNELL, BRADLEY J 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): LARSEN, L* BRUCE 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: October 12, 1984 
Video 
Tape Number: VIDEO Tape Count: 10:27 
CHARGES 
1. AGGRAVATED ROBBERY - 1st Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition; 08/16/2004 Guilty 
2. AGGRAVATED ROBBERY - 1st Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/16/2004 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ROBBERY a 1st 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than six years and which may be life in the Utah State 
Prison-
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ROBBERY a 1st 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than six years and which may be life in the Utah State 
Prison* 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff; The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
Page 1 
Case NO: 041901010 
Dates Oct 04/ 2004 
defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
COMMITMENTS TO RUN CONCURRENT. 
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE 
COURT RECOMMENDS DEFT RECEIVE CREDIT FOR 239 DAYS TIME SERVED. 
COURT ALSO RECOMMENDS DEFT RECEIVE MENTAL HEALTH EVALUATION AND 
TREATMENT. RESTITUTION TO BE DETERMINED BY BOARD OF PARDONS. 
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